Guest Speaker: Austin Horng-En Wang (Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Lecture Abstract:

Moral hazard (MH) has been a persistent concern in U.S. alliance politics, which assumes that allies are motivated to reduce their defense efforts in response to stronger U.S. commitments. Cases from recent literature, including Taiwan’s substantial increase in defense spending between 2021 and 2024 when the Biden administration accidentally emphasized its assurances, challenge this MH assumption. This article proposes goal
interdependence (GI) as an alternative explanation: when the U.S. and its allies share the same strategic goal, such as maintaining the status quo, perceived U.S. efforts trigger reciprocal contributions rather than free riding. Evidence from a survey experiment (PollcracyLab, 2025, n = 1,300) and a nationally representative survey (TNSS, 2024, n = 1,506) in Taiwan supports the GI mechanism but not the MH. The findings offer theoretical and policy implications for understanding alliance behavior and sustaining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.